Purpose -This paper aims to assess the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on trade using a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008.
• respect of laws in place (Choi, 2010) ; • relevance of transparency (Bell et al., 2014) ; • greater publicity and freedom of the press (Hoffman et al., 2013) ; • behavioural analysis of motivations towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) ; • the relevance of educational mechanisms (Brockhoff et al., 2014) like lifelong-learning (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a) and bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) ; • role of global warming (Price and Elu, 2016) ; • corruption-control as the most effective governance mechanism in the battle against conflicts and crimes (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2016 ); • use of military tactics and strategies (Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010) ; and • policy harmonisation for predicting conflicts like the 2011 Arab Spring (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016b) and fighting terrorism (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017) .
Another stream of the literature has been focused on investigating the relationships between political instability, violence and macroeconomic indicators. To the best of our knowledge, this stream includes:
• Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) on the effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment (FDI); • Koh (2007) on the terrorism-innovation nexus; • the influence of natural resources (Humphreys, 2005) ; and • the terrorism-growth nexus with both unidirectional (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009; Öcal and Yildirim, 2010; Meierrieks and Gries, 2013; Piazza, 2006; Choi, 2015) and bidirectional (Gries et al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013; Shahzad et al., 2015) flows and the instrumentality of foreign aid in mitigating the negative impact on FDI from terrorism (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015; .
This study is positioned as an extension of this last strand of the literature, notably, on the role of development assistance in mitigating the potentially negative impact of terrorism on trade openness. For brevity and lack space, how the positioning of this inquiry aligns with the trade-terrorism literature is discussed Section 2. The rest of the study is structured as follows. The relevant literature and theoretical underpinnings are engaged in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. The empirical results, discussion and implications are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with future research directions. et al. (2009a) have empirically assessed how nearness to the source of terrorism exerts negative spillovers on trade to conclude that more work is needed for:
• a theory to elucidate the interplay between security policy, the spread of transnational terrorism and international trade; and • more robustness checks on transnational terrorism spillovers.
De Sousa et al. (2009b) assess the effect of international terrorism diffusion on trade and security. The empirical model is based on the assumption that nearness to the sources of terrorism bears an inverse relationship with the corresponding negative spillovers. The underlying idea is that measures of security that reduce trade affect both the source-country of terror and her neighbours. Conversely, countries that are located relatively far from the "country of terror" could benefit by experiencing more trade. The authors find:
• a direct negative effect on trade from transnational terrorism;
• an indirect negative effect accruing from terrorism to neighbouring nations; and • with remoteness to terror, trade increases.
Second, on causality flowing from trade to terrorism, the scant literature has for the most part focused on the trade of illicit commodities. Piazza (2011) , using the conventional wisdom that trade in illicit drugs fuels terrorism, has assessed the link between "drugs trade" and terrorism to establish that the production of illicit drugs, cocaine and opiate significantly increase domestic and transnational terrorism, whereas drug interdiction and crop eradication have the opposite effects. Piazza (2012) has investigated the nexus between "trade in opium" and terrorism in 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996-2008 using binomial regressions. The author concludes that provinces in which opium is produced are associated with higher levels of attacks and casualties, with the direction of causation flowing from the production of opium to higher levels of terrorism.
To the best of our knowledge, the third strand on modelling issues in the underlying relationship is clearly articulated by Mirza and Verdier (2008) after a survey. They have presented some pitfalls in the empirical literature on the trade-terrorism nexus, namely, the need to:
• account for omitted variables which could be correlated with both trade and terrorism; • seriously acknowledge the inter-temporal persistent character of terrorism; • distinguish between the effects of incidental occurrences in particular countries from the impact of incidents targeting the source-country; and • control for endogeneity.
Noticeably in the above literature, there is room for improvement in at least three main dimensions: imperative of exploring more terrorism dynamics, role of a policy variable in the effect of terrorism on trade and need for modelling approaches that are robust to endogeneity. First, Choi (2015) has cautioned on the need to explore more indicators when investigating the relationship between terrorism and macroeconomic variables. To this end, recent literature has used a plethora of terrorism indicators: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables. Our use of these four terrorism dynamics complements available studies on the trade-terrorism nexus which have fundamentally been based on:
• transnational terrorism, for causality flowing from terrorism to trade (De Sousa et al., 2009a , 2009b ; and • transnational and domestic terrorism, for the effect of trade on terrorism (Piazza, 2011) .
Second, to provide room for more policy implications, we include a policy variable that mitigates the potentially negative effect of terrorism on trade. Consistent with a stream of recent studies on the terrorism-FDI relationship (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015) , we use foreign aid as the policy variable. Hence, we steer clear of the engaged terrorism-trade literature above that does not use policy interactive variables. Moreover, we are consistent with the highlighted caution of Choi (2015) by using three foreign aid variables to avail room for more policy options: bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid. The underlying motivation is to examine the role of foreign aid in dampening the potentially negative effects of terrorism on trade. As we have seen above, evidence of a potentially negative effect has been established in exploratory (Richardson, 2004) and empirical (De Sousa et al., 2009a , 2009b literature. Third, Mirza and Verdier (2008) have cautioned from their survey on the imperative of empirical strategies that are robust to endogeneity. To this end, we adopt a generalised method of moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations that has been documented to be more robust compared to traditional system and difference GMM approaches because it accounts for cross-sectional dependence and mitigates the proliferation of instruments (Love and Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Roodman, 2009a Roodman, , 2009b .
In the light of above underpinnings, this line of inquiry assesses how foreign aid dynamics mitigate the potentially negative impact of terrorism on trade in a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008. The focus on developing countries and periodicity has a threefold motivation. First, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) have established that the negative effects of terrorism on macroeconomic indicators are more pronounced in developing countries because, relative to their developed counterparts, they lack the financial, technological and logistical means to absorb the corresponding economic shocks without significant negative externalities. Hence, the policy syndrome is more relevant to developing countries. Second, foreign aid is conventionally channeled from developed to developing countries. Third, we are also motivated by the interest of comparing the findings with those established in prior literature on the terrorism-FDI nexus that has been based on the same periodicity and sample. Accordingly, the underlying FDI-oriented literature has also investigated the role of foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014) , especially when the nexus is conditioned the on corruption-control levels in recipient countries or assessed throughout the conditional distribution of the dependent variable .
Consistent with the engaged terrorism-trade literature above, De Sousa et al. (2009a) have cautioned inter alia, on the need to clearly articulate a theory that elucidates the interplay between security policy, terrorism and international trade. Within the context of this line of inquiry, security policy is captured by the foreign aid variable. To this end, we briefly engage the theoretical underpinnings motivating the line of inquiry. In accordance with recent FDI-terrorism literature , theories surrounding the intuition of the study are consistent with the conflict management model (CMM) of Thomas (1992) and the social control theory (SCT) from Black (1990) , documented by Akinwale (2010, p. 125) . The SCT postulates that, nexuses among groups, individuals and organisations influence the exercise of one of five principal mechanisms of social control: avoidance, settlement, negotiation, self-help and tolerance. On the other hand, the CMM postulates that strategic intentions which are most probable of revolving around a two-factor matrix (of assertiveness and cooperation), when combined with collaboration yield five main conflict management styles: accommodation, competition, compromise, avoidance and collaboration. The above theoretical underpinnings are broadly consistent with the literature on conflict management (Borg, 1992; Volkema and Bergmann, 1995) . These underpinnings converge with the positioning of this study in the perspective that foreign aid can be used as a foreign policy variable to enhance conditions that mitigate terrorism, notably, in subsidising of government expenditure as established by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) , improving the rule of law and boosting education (Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008a Heyneman, , 2008b Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a) .
Data and methodology 3.1 Data
Consistent with the motivation of the study, we examine a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008. Justifications for the choice of sample and periodicity have been provided in the introduction. In accordance with the underlying terrorism-FDI literature, not all developing countries are included into the sample to avoid the findings being influenced by terrorism outliers Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014) . Therefore, Afghanistan, Western Gaza, Iraq and Palestine are not included in the sample [3] . The data consist of three-year averages in terms of non-overlapping intervals. This structuring helps to mitigate business cycle (or short-run) disturbances that may substantially loom.
The dependent variable is trade openness which is defined as the sum of exports to imports as a percentage of GDP. Independent variables of interest consist of terrorism dynamics: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-national actors with the purpose of using intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders and Sandler, 2006) . The terrorism variables account for the number of yearly terrorism incidents registered in a country. To prevent mathematical concerns related to log-transforming zeros on the one hand and correct of the positive skew in the data, the study takes the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base. This transformation approach is consistent with recent literature (Choi and Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi and Asongu, 2016) .
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6) . Domestic terrorism:
[…] includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue country (p. 6).
Transnational terrorism is:
[…] terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another.
Unclear terrorism is that, "which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism" (p. 6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms. The foreign aid variables include multilateral aid, bilateral aid and total aid. The control variables are GDP growth, infrastructure, inflation, exchange rate, political globalisation and internal conflicts. These variables are broadly consistent with the underlying literature on the relationship between terrorism and FDI Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016c; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014) . We expect GDP growth, infrastructural development and increasing exchange rate to exert positive impacts on trade, while inflation and civil/internal conflicts should have the opposite effect. Consistent with Rodrik (2008) , high exchange rates are very likely to stimulate trade in developing countries. Infrastructural development and GDP growth have been documented to affect trade openness positively (Asongu, 2015a; Akpan, 2014) . High inflation should reduce the volume of trade owing to greater uncertainty. This is essentially because investors have been documented to prefer investment strategies that are less ambiguous (Le Roux and Kelsey and Le Roux, 2016) . The impact of political globalisation cannot be established "a priori" because its effect substantially depends on the leverage of the sampled developing countries in international "decision making" processes (Asongu, 2014a) . The discussed variables are defined in Table I .
The summary statistics of the variables is provided in Table II . Two main observations are noteworthy: variables are comparable in terms of means, and there is substantial variation from the standard deviations to give us some confidence that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge.
The purpose of the correlation matrix in Table III is to address issues of overparameterisation and multicollinearity that are italicised. We observe that foreign aid and terrorism indicators are highly correlated among themselves, respectively. Hence, we avoid using more than two aid or terrorism variables in the same specification. As concerns relationships between the remaining variables, the issue of multicollinearity is not apparent.
Methodology
Consistent with the motivation in the introduction and underlying terrorism literature , we adopt a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of Arellano and Bover (1995) that has the advantage of controlling for cross-sectional dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love and Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) . This simultaneity-robust empirical technique is important because as we have seen in the introduction, trade has also been documented to influence terrorism activities (Piazza, 2011 (Piazza, , 2012 [4] .
The following equation (1) and first difference in equation (2) summarises the estimation procedure:
where: Trade i,t is trade openness of country i at period t; 0 is a constant; represents the coefficient of autoregression; A, Foreign aid; T , Terrorism; AT, interaction between Foreign aid (A) and Terrorism (T); W is the vector of control variables (GDP growth, exchange rate, inflation, infrastructure, political globalisation and internal conflicts); i is the country-specific effect; t is the time-specific constant and i,t the error term. In the specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent.
As the estimation procedure entails interaction among variables, it is important to briefly discuss how we avoid pitfalls to interactive regressions which have been documented by Brambor et al. (2006) . We enter all constitutive variables into the specifications. In addition, for our estimations to have economic meaning, the combined significance is interpreted in terms of marginal impact. Accordingly, the modifying or policy foreign aid indicators should be within the ranges provided by the summary statistics for the corresponding marginal effects to be economically meaningful.
Empirical results

Presentation of results
Tables IV-VI show the findings corresponding to bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid, respectively. All the tables entail four specification categories, notably on domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. The left-hand side (LHS) of respective tables entails specifications in the absence of the conditioning information set (or control variables), whereas specifications of the right-hand side (RHS) incorporate control variables.
In accordance with Efobi et al. (2015) , four principal criteria are employed to assess the validity of specified models. First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelations in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that the instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, while the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. To restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that the instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in all specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen test for the exogeneity of instruments is also used to confirm the validity of findings from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, we also provide the Fisher test which assesses the joint validity of estimated coefficients. The following findings can be established in relation to Table IV on linkages between trade, bilateral aid and terrorism. First, only the sixth specification does not fulfil the information criteria for the validity of models. It should be noted that we are working with significant levels of 1 and 5 per cent. Second, bilateral aid does not significantly affect trade. Third, in the first and fourth specifications, domestic and total terrorism, respectively, increase trade with the positive magnitude of the former relatively higher. Fourth, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between bilateral aid and terrorism display thresholds that are within the range (0.765 to 8.362) of bilateral aid provided by the summary statistics, with respective thresholds of 5.347 (0.123/0.023) for domestic terrorism and 5.125 (0.082/ 0.016) for total terrorism. Fifth one net positive impact and net null net effect are apparent. Accordingly, the net effect is computed to examine the overall impact of the foreign aid policy variable on terrorism for international trade. For example, in the second column of Table IV , the net effect on trade from the interaction between domestic terrorism and bilateral aid is 0.004 ([Ϫ0.023 ϫ 5.181] ϩ 0.123). Where, the mean value of bilateral aid is 5.181, the unconditional impact of domestic terrorism is 0.123, while the conditional impact from the interaction between domestic terrorism and bilateral aid is Ϫ0.023.
Sixth, on the control variables:
• infrastructural development and exchange rate improvements have the expected signs (Rodrik, 2008; Akpan, 2014 ); • the positive sign of internal conflicts is consistent with the impact of terrorism; and • inflation could positively influence trade and economic prosperity if it is low and stable.
Accordingly, the mean value of inflation is 2.41.
The following findings can be established in relation to Table V on linkages between trade, multilateral aid and terrorism. First, only the sixth specification does not fulfil the information criteria for validity of models. Second, multilateral aid positively affects trade only in the third specification. Third, in the first and fourth specifications, domestic and total terrorism, respectively, do not significantly increase trade. This is contrary to the findings of Table IV . Fourth, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between multilateral aid and terrorism cannot be investigated further because the underlying terrorism effects are not significant. Fifth, no net effects are apparent. Sixth, on the control variables, justification of the positive effects from inflation and civil conflicts are consistent with those provided for Table IV .
In relation to Table VI , the following are apparent on the linkages between trade, total aid and terrorism. First, all specifications fulfil the information criteria for validity of models. Second, total aid positively affects trade in the third specification. Third, in the first, second, fourth and fifth specifications, domestic, transnational and total terrorisms increase trade with the following order of increasing magnitude: total terrorism, domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. Fourth, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between total aid and terrorism display thresholds that are within the range (0.800 to 8.495) of total aid provided by the summary statistics, with respective thresholds of 5.461 (0.142/0.026) for domestic terrorism, 5.222 (0.893/ 0.171) for transnational terrorism and 5.411 (0.092/0.017) for total terrorism. Fifth, the corresponding significant net effects are negative. Sixth, on the control variables, justification of the positive effects from inflation, exchange rate and civil conflicts are consistent with those provided for Tables IV-V.
Further discussion of results and policy implications
Consistent with the intuition motivating this line of inquiry, while we expected development assistance to exert a positive effect on trade, the positive impact of terrorism on trade was nonetheless unexpected. Evidence of the latter has been found in:
• domestic and total terrorisms for bilateral aid regressions; and • total, domestic and transnational terrorisms for total aid estimations, with increasing positive magnitude.
First, these findings are contrary to the engaged literature, notably Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on the evidence that terrorism reduces trade; Richardson (2004) on security measures in the post-9/11 terrorists attacks in the USA and underpinnings of De Sousa et al. (2009a Sousa et al. ( , 2009b . Second, a possible elucidation of these unexpected results could be the fact that some incidences of terrorism might not significantly impact trade negatively during the sampled periodicity . It is interesting to note that while we have motivated the choice of our sample periodicity, the recent 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13) has revealed that activities of terrorism have been significantly on the rise since the wake of 2011 Arab Spring. Third, another possible explanation for the positive effect of terrorism on trade may be that more advanced-developing countries (with the capacity of absorbing terrorist activities without significant negative externalities) weigh greatly on the outcome of the underlying effect. This interpretation is consistent with the narrative of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) that has been lately confirmed in a growing stream of literature, notably Öcal and Yildirim (2010) and Meierrieks and Gries (2013) . Fourth, despite the potential for mild terrorism in some countries, investors may be still willing to take additional risks with the hope of a more proportionate return to investment. For instance, despite threats from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, China has continued to invest in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Obi, 2008) . Moreover, China has a long-term strategy of doing business even in countries with political strife and outlook of political instability (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013; Elu and Price, 2010) . As a policy implication, blanket policies targeting the use of foreign aid to mitigate the potentially negative effects of terrorism on trade should be treated with caution, especially in the pre-2011 Arab Spring era.
Another bone of contention established is the unexpected negative interaction between development assistance and terrorism on trade. A likely explanation to this finding may be traceable to the political economy of foreign aid. In essence, some types of foreign aid that are used to dampen the potentially negative effects of terrorism may end-up running counter to the prescribed objectives, especially if baseline impacts of terrorism dynamics on trade are not understood by foreign policy. This narrative is consistent with the stream of literature maintaining that overly reliance on development assistance might increase political instability and violence due to low political accountability and representation (Eubank, 2012; Asongu, 2015b) . As a policy implication, it is recommendable to first establish empirically, what degree of terrorism is negative for trade before engaging the policy direction of using foreign aid to dampen the corresponding underlying negative nexus.
The expected positive effect of foreign aid on trade is broadly consistent with the literature documenting the positive role of development assistance in economic development (Kargbo and Sen, 2014; Asiedu, 2014; Gyimah-Brempong and Racine, 2014) . However, it is interesting to clarify why the effect of bilateral aid is insignificant relative to the impact of multilateral and total aids. The insignificant effects of the former may be traceable to the "political economic" strings related to development assistance, whereby compared to bilateral aid, multilateral aid has less strings attached with its allocation. This is essentially because "consensus building" among donors with varying strategic interests is relatively difficult to be established. Hence, aid allocation decisions may eventually be based on the primary interest of recipient countries. Conversely with bilateral aid, by definition, evidence of conflicting interests among donors is not at play. Whereas, Biscaye et al. (2015) have recently shown from a survey of the literature that no significant difference exists between the development outcomes of bilateral aid vis-à-vis multilateral aid, the intuition for our interpretation is embedded in the common knowledge that former colonial powers provide aid to former colonies in view of preserving strategic interests that vary across donors. This interpretation can be summarised with the conclusions of Asongu (2014b, p. 272) :
Aid is the outcome of bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these vary over time. For instance, economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in French aid. Hence, few would object to the inference that our findings may also be explained by a motivation of the French to maintain their colonial legacies and influence in Africa.
As a policy implication, multilateral aid is more positively predisposed to stimulating trade openness in developing countries, relative to bilateral aid.
In line with the motivation provided for the choice of sample periodicity, we devote some space to engaging how the findings have contributed to the extant literature that has used the same sample and periodicity and been motivated by the role of foreign aid in potentially dampening the negative effect of terrorism on macroeconomic variables. It should be noted that Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) , Efobi et al. (2015) and have used FDI as the outcome variable. Efobi et al. (2015) which is conditioned on existing levels of corruption-control levels in recipient countries have partially confirmed the conclusions of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) , after conditioning the investigation on domestic corruption-control and using a more robust GMM strategy.
The paper by is an extension on Efobi et al.'s (2015) work with the assumption that underlying linkages could vary throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. The intuition for the extension with quantile regressions is that blanket policies cannot be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of FDI and tailored differently across high-FDI and low-FDI countries. The findings of the present study contribute to the existing knowledge on the underlying relations in a multitude of ways, inter alia, the:
• use of a trade openness as outcome variable;
• confirmation of the findings of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) only with respect to the effect of foreign aid on the dependent variable and not with regard to the impact of terrorism and interactive effects of "terrorism and foreign aid"; and • partial validation of Efobi et al. (2015) and on the rejection of the expected signs (from terrorism and interactions) postulated in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) .
As a policy implication, applied econometrics should be granted a broader scope and not be exclusively restricted to the verification of whether existing theories are valid. This is essentially because the extension of previous studies with the same periodicity and sample could add more perspectives to conventional narratives of economic phenomena.
Conclusion and further research directions
This study has assessed the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on trade using a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive GMM estimations with forward orthogonal deviations. Bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid are used, whereas terrorism entails domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The following findings have been established. First, while bilateral aid has no significant effect on trade, multilateral aid and total aid have positive effects. Second total terrorism, domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism increase trade with an order of increasing magnitude from the first to the third. Third, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between foreign aid (bilateral and total) and terrorism display thresholds that are within range. Fourth, there is scant evidence of positive net effects. Overall, the findings broadly indicate that foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for completely dampening the effects of terrorism on trade. We have clarified the established linkages in the light of existing literature and discussed resulting policy implications. The above findings and policy implications obviously leave room for future research in the following areas, inter alia:
• improving scholarly understanding of channels through which terrorism positively influence trade openness and clarifying the negative marginal effect from the interaction between terrorism and foreign aid on trade; • using post-Arab Spring data for different perspectives on the underlying nexuses;
• distinguishing initial levels of trade and terrorisms in the underlying relationships; and • elucidating why multilateral aid relative to bilateral aid more positively stimulates trade openness.
